Emergence of Cooperation in Non-scale-free Networks
gongjianjun 添加于 2015-10-10 19:26
| 1275 次阅读 | 0 个评论
作 者
Zhang Y, Aziz-Alaoui MA, Bertelle C, Zhou S, Wang W
摘 要
Evolutionary game theory is one of the key paradigms behind many scientific disciplines from science to engineering. Previous studies proposed a strategy updating mechanism, which successfully demonstrated that the scale-free network can provide a framework for the emergence of cooperation. Instead, individuals in random graphs and small-world networks do not favor cooperation under this updating rule. However, a recent empirical result shows the heterogeneous networks do not promote cooperation when humans play a Prisoner\'s Dilemma. In this paper, we propose a strategy updating rule with payoff memory. We observe that the random graphs and small-world networks can provide even better frameworks for cooperation than the scale-free networks in this scenario. Our observations suggest that the degree heterogeneity may be neither a sufficient condition nor a necessary condition for the widespread cooperation in complex networks. Also, the topological structures are not sufficed to determine the level of cooperation in complex networks. -
详细资料
- 关键词: physics.soc-ph; cs.GT; cs.SI
- 文献种类: Manual Script
- 期卷页: 2014年
- 日期: 2014-05-05
- 发布方式: arXiv e-prints
- 备注:arXiv:1405.0761v1; 6 pages, 5 figures
-
评论( 人)